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THE AUTHORS WERE faced with the problem of estimating the size
of reserve which would have been necessary for absorbing losses on
medium- and high-grade corporate bonds during the first half of this
century. Upon searching the literature to see what help could be
gained from past authorities, we found that there is a gap between
the doctrines by theorists as to the kind of experience expectable
and the best published statistics of realized yields and loss rates.'
We are passing along the results of a small effort to plug this gap in
the hope that it will help others who are similarly faced with the
necessity of using the record of the past performance of corporate
bonds in connection with problems of evaluation of probable future
performance.
Theorists in the field of investments seem generally to offer sup-
port for the idea that some reserve is desirable. This is found in such
doctrines that, in contrast with common stocks, where either gain or
loss may be expected, the nature of the contract in unconvertible cor-
porate bonds severely limits the possibilities of gain but leaves quite
open the possibilities of loss up to 100 per cent. Again, there is the
doctrine that bond investment is a "negative art," requiring princi-
pally the gauging of the chances for loss and the estimating of what
premium in yield is appropriate for acceptance of those chances.
Many writers have regarded the difference between the prospective
yield from market price on a bond and the yield prevailing at the
same time on riskless securities of similar term as consisting mainly
1. The best published statistics on the realized yields and loss rates on corporate
bonds are in W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experi-
ence and Statistical Measures of Corporate Bond Financing (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1959 and 1960, respectively). Inasmuch as our purpose is to supplement
and build upon the material already published by Mr. Hickman, our debt to him is
obvious. We are also deeply indebted to the National Bureau of Economic Research
for tabulating individual yields from their punched cards in such a manner as to permit
the derivation of our "modified" realized yields and loss rates-particularly to Dr.
Geoffrey Moore for his stimulating ideas and to Miss Elizabeth T. Simpson, whose
grasp of our problem and knowledge of the basic records were extremely helpful.
Grateful acknowledgment is made to Robert Morrison, William Dawn, and Gary L.
Swenson, graduate students at the University of Wisconsin, for statistical assistance.
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of premium offered the investor for assuming risk of later loss. This
sort of theory reached perhaps its most extreme form in the writings
of Kirshman, who implied that, within a diversified portfolio of
bonds, sufficiently large for averages to work out, greater losses
would later be incurred among the bonds of higher-risk premiums
which would reduce their average realized yield below the prospec-
tive, probably down to the level of the prospective yields prevailing
on only the riskless ones," Thus there is the implication that the in-
terest receipts in excess of those on the safest bonds should not be
regarded as income but as an offset to losses expected to be experi-
enced on the portfolio of such bonds later when defaults occur and
that, for the institutional investor capable of reserving income, such
risk premiums presumably indicate the proper rates of reservation
for later losses.
Turning now to the literature on statistics of yields of corporate
bonds, most of the published statistics have been, as in the case of
Macaulay" and Durand," in terms of the prospective yields-look-
ing forward from market prices in anticipation of performance ac-
cording to the contract. Such yields might also be characterized as
"ex ante," "expected," "anticipatory," or "market" yields. There
has been a growing literature reflecting attempts to contrast such
anticipatory yields with yields which measure the departures of ac-
tual from anticipated performance." This latter type of yield is vari-
ously characterized as "actual," "realized," "ex post," or "life-
span" yields. And the deficiencies of the ex post from the ex ante
yields--of the realized from the prospective yields-have been
characterized as "loss rates"-measuring the rates of annual reser-
vations from interest receipts which would have been necessary in
order to offset subsequent losses. Such realized yields and loss rates
have been computed not only for various categories of corporate
bonds but also for varying length and calendar terminal points of
2. J. E. Kirshman, Principles of Investment (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., 1933), pp. 95, 109-10.
3. Frederick A. Macaulay, Interest Rates, Bond Yields, and Stock Prices (New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1938).
4. David Durand, "Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900-1942" (Technical Paper
No.3 [New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1942]).
5. For some "pre-Hickman" studies involving "realized" yields, see A. S. Dewing,
The Financial Policy of Corporations (New York: Ronald Press, 1926), pp. 1194-95;
H. G. Fraine, "Superiority of High-Yield Bonds Not Substantiated by 1927-1936
Performance," Annalist (New York Times Publishing Co.), October 1, 1937; Leo
Spurrier, "Common Stocks and Bonds as Long-Term Investments," Journal of Busi-
ness (January, 1941), XIV, 9.
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assumed periods of holding. They have been computed on the basis 
of holding from issue to extinguishment of the contract, as well as 
on the basis of purchase on certain dates and sale a t  other dates. 
For the purpose of measuring default risk, the measures covering 
holdings during the years of the depression of the 1930’s are most 
useful because during that period bonds suffered as much from de- 
fault and value depreciation as seems likely ever to be experienced 
in the future. The period of the thirties is thus regarded as furnish- 
ing a sort of acid test. 
All the various realized yields for which statistics have been pub- 
lished have one characteristic in common. They reflect the effects on 
realized yields of money-market changes just as readily as they do 
effects of credit impairment or default. The realized yields are in- 
creased above the prospective yields by reason of calls for redemp- 
tion at prices higher than the maturity value, as well as lowered be- 
low the prospective yield as the result of impairments in the pay- 
ment of interest or principal. For bonds outstanding on a date of 
assumed market liquidation, as at the end of a period of study, the 
realized yields are pushed above the prospective yields if the market 
rate of interest at such a time is below the market level a t  the time 
of assumed purchase, as well as pushed below the prospective yields 
by declines in market values by reason of impairment of the credit 
standing of the debtor. The published realized-yield statistics which 
average these diverse effects are found to be very reassuring by 
some institutional investors, who cite them as evidence that the his- 
tory of this period of admittedly acid test indicates that no reserve 
is necessary. 
Those taking this position are fond of citing that the most com- 
prehensive and useful publication of such yields shows that the av- 
erage realized yield on a representative portfolio of corporate bonds 
of the four highest agency rating grades during the span of years 
from early 1900 to early 1944 was actually in excess of, instead of 
deficient from, the prospective yield, in spite of the facts that in 
each of those years actual interest payments were less than con- 
tracted fore and that the proportion of all outstanding straight cor- 
porate bonds in default reached as high as about 15 per cent in 1936 
and 1940.? Had the large issues of the top four rating grades run to 
6. See W. Braddock Hickman, The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing since 
7 .  Calculated from Tables A-2 and A-17 of Hickman, ibid., pp. 257 and 340. 
1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), Table A-25, p. 380. 
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maturity with interest and principal payments unimpaired, they 
would have given the investor a yield of 4.8 per cent! In spite of 
some bonds defaulting and many others declining in liquidating 
value because of impairment of credit condition, the averagea real- 
ized yield for the entire group was 5.2 per cent.’ Some investors are 
unduly impressed by the fact that, instead of an expected loss rate, 
there was an average rate of gain of the realized over the prospec- 
tive yield of 0.4 per cent per m u m  (5.2 - 4.8). Such a result is 
at least superficially contrary to the theoretical doctr’ines and came 
about, of course, because the gains in redemption values and final 
market values of many bonds, due mainly to changes in money- 
market conditions, more than offset the defection of the realized 
from the prospective yields of other bonds within the portfolio 
caused by defaults in interest and principal payments and by depre- 
ciation in final liquidation value due to deterioration in credit pros- 
pects. Hickman says: 
Thus, if all of the bond issues in this study are conceived of as pooled into a 
single portfolio held from offering to extinguishment or 1944, the portfolio 
would have suffered no loss in current dollars. This is a truly remarkable finding 
in view of the fact that the record spans a period of forty-four years that in- 
cludes a great war and a great depression.10 
For the purpose of estimating the reserve needs of large-scale 
continuing investors, it was desired to supplement the already pub- 
lished realized yields and loss rates with “modified” realized yields 
and loss rates which reduce, though do not completely remove, the 
effect of money-market influences on final liquidation values. To 
continuing investors the retirement of an issue before maturity at a 
premium over the maturity payment is usually a disadvantage 
rather than an advantage, because retirements by call are usually 
at the option of the issuer rather than the investor and are usually 
under conditions which are advantageous to the issuer and disad- 
vantageous to the investor-namely, when the market rate of in- 
terest for refunding and therefore for reinvestment in the same de- 
gree of risk is lower than the contract rate in the security already 
outstanding. Under such circumstances reinvestment at the same 
degree of risk usually involves a loss on the reinvestment much 
8. Hickman, Statistical Measures, p. 394. 
9. Mean of individual percentage annual yields of individual bonds weighted by 
dollar volume a t  issuance. For detailed background on the computation and averag- 
ing of bond yields, see Hickman, Bond Qudity, pp. 54-66. 
10. Ibid., p. 73. 
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lation confined to issues which were both issued and extinguished
within the span of years of the study,
... the loss rate rises from - 0.1 per cent (inferring capital gains) to 0.1 per
cent (inferring capital losses). The implication would seem to be that investors
who are unable to take advantage of market appreciation on outstanding issues
(but are required by statute to write securities down to market under certain
circumstances) would require somewhat higher loss reserves than those needed
by investors generally. So far as can be judged from the record before us, a re-
serve accumulated at the rate of 0.1 per cent on book value would have been
adequate to take care of default losses on large issues offered and extinguished
within the period studied.P
This refinement is at the cost of omitting, from averaging, the yields
of the great population of bonds outstanding at the end of the rec-
ord, some of which were still suffering from credit impairment and
from failure to complete reorganization following default. Also, it
still leaves in the record the abnormally high gains from calls, which
also resulted from the drop in interest rates. Most of the bonds ex-
tinguished during this period were extinguished by call. The calls at
premiums were allowed to push the realized yields above the pro-
spective yields. Inasmuch as most of such retirements were toward
the end of the period, reinvestment would have been made in bonds
which were issued at such low interest rates as not so likely in turn
to be redeemed at premiums. The abnormality of the volume of re-
demption at premiums is indicated by the fact that the average pro-
portion of redemptions by call during the latter half of the period
studied was about ten times that of the earlier half." The problem
is to retain the successful along with the unsuccessful bonds with-
out retaining the gains in realized yields caused by the change in
level of interest rates.
In order to retain as much as possible of the effects of defaults
and impairment of credit prospects and eliminate as much as pos-
sible of the effects of purely money-market influences, the authors
have derived "modified" averages of the realized (life-span) yields
and loss rates for all large" straight corporate bonds outstanding
during the period 1900-1944. This was done by the simple device of
substituting the contractual yield for the realized yield for those
undefaulting bonds for which the realized was in excess of the pro-
spective yield. For such bonds the somewhat dubious gains of the
realized over the expected yields-reflecting mainly the effect of the
12. Hickman, Bond Quality, p. 83.
13. Computed from Hickman, Statistical Measures, Table 165, p. 297.
14. More than $5,000,000 in size of issue.
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falling level of interest rates on redemption values and final market
prices-are eliminated.
This treatment involves the working assumption (some qualifica-
tions of which are noted in the next paragraph) that the excesses of
realized over prospective yields on undefaulted bonds were due to
lower interest rates and not to improved credit prospects. (The un-
precedentedly low interest rates during the time of abnormally high
call volume and at the end of the experience record were accom-
panied by stock prices well below half their 1929 high.) In other
words, the working assumption is that the bonds which were called
at premiums over face would have run to maturity and been re-
deemed at face value. And that those undefaulted bonds still out-
standing at the end which were quoted in the market at liquidating
prices such that the realized yields were above the prospective owed
the gain to the influence on bond prices of the unprecedentedly low
interest rates prevailing at the end of 1943. From these assumptions
it would follow that, had there been no change in the level of basic
interest rate, the realized yields on both groups of bonds mentioned
above would have been equal to, instead of in excess of, their pro-
spective yields." Substituting the individual prospective yields on
this population of bonds for their actual realized yields, in averag-
ing the realized yields of these plus of those of the population of
bonds whose actual realized yields were not in excess of their pro-
spective yields, gives us our "modified" realized-yield average for
the combined population without loss of the record of any of the
bonds.
The lower realized yields and higher loss rates resulting, how-
ever, do not give a complete separation of the effects of default and
credit impairment from the effects of changes in the interest-rate
level. Some of the premium redemptions and higher liquidating val-
ues may have resulted from other causes than a decline in the gen-
eral level of interest rates, perhaps because of better cash position
or improved financial prospects of the issuer. Much of the small
volume of calls during the first two decades of the century was
probably for such reasons. However, it was during the last decade
and a half of the period studied that the volume of bonds outstand-
ing was the largest, that the proportion of calls and refundings was
15. It might be argued that the uptilting term structure of the interest rate pre-
vailing toward the end of the experience record would alone have caused the bonds
to be higher in price because their terms would have become shorter. But the tilt of
the term structure could well have resulted from the descent of interest rates to an
abnormally low level. See, for example, R. I. Robinson, The Management Of Bank
Funds (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951), p. 328.
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abnormally high, and that the interest-rate level became unprece-
dentedly 10w.16 Inasmuch as the favorable money-market conditions
were accompanied by a severe business depression and abnormally
high volume of defaults, it seems likely that most of the individual
excesses of realized over prospective yields, on the other hand, were
due to ease of money rather than to improvement in credit standing
of the issuers. It must be recognized also that money-market influ-
ences have not been removed from the realized yields and loss rates
of those bonds which defaulted or of those bonds whose market
values at the close of the experience record were such as to produce
a deficiency of realized from expected yield.!"
Except, then, for minor impurities, the modified averages of real-
ized yields tend to approach, but not quite reach, what the bonds
would have yielded without the fortunate and abnormal gains from
interest-rate-level changes. The modified averages of loss rates in-
dicate roughly how much of the interest receipts of the entire port-
folio would have had to be reserved in order to compensate for losses
on the portion of the portfolio that defaulted and on the portion
suffering from decline in market value at the end of the study be-
cause of credit deterioration.
The modified loss rate represents the rate which it would have
been wise to have reserved under a policy of treating any gains over
the prospective yield as purely fortuitous. Such a policy has its
points, not only because of the questionableness of such "gains" as
income for a continuing investor, but also because of the erratic
pattern of calls and the imprudence of counting upon the repetition
of the abnormally high proportion of them.
The resulting modified averages of realized yields and loss rates
are presented in the last two columns 'of Table 2 (see pp. 431 and
432).18 The modified and unmodified average realized yields for
the population of most interest to our argument-on all large cor-
porate bonds issued and outstanding between January 1, 1900, and
December 1, 1943, and carrying at time of issuance one of the four
16. See Hickman, Corporate Bond Financing, pp. 250, 292, 300, and 129.
17. Limitations of data on the punched cards did not permit this step. The modified
averages of realized yields would presumably have been even lower and the resulting
loss rates even higher, had we found it possible to remove the effect of interest-level
change on their final market values.
18. The population on which they are based is the $55,181 million of large issues
mentioned on p. 35 of Hickman's Bond Quality, less $2,743 million of irregular offerings.
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highest agency rating grades-compare with their average promised
yields as shown in the accompanying table.
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.5
4.3
4.3
5.1
5.1
5.0
5.8
5.0
5.2
WEIGHTED MEAN ANNuAL RATE
(PER CENT)
Realized Yield
Unmodified Modified
Promised
Yield
4.5
4.5
4.9
5.4
4.7
4.8
AGENCY RATING
1. .
II .
IlL .
IV .
I-III. .
I-IV .
*Median of various agency ratings at time of offering: I com-
parable to AAA, AI+, etc.; II, to AA, AI, etc.; IV, to BAA, 1lI+.
It may be of some interest to note that the modified realized
yields give a pattern much closer to the uniformity expected by
Kirshman than do the unmodified. The pattern of the mean defi-
ciency (loss rate )19 of the modified realized from the prospective
yields is much more in line with the default frequency and the dif-
ferentials in risk implied by both the median ratings of the leading
rating agencies and the prospective yields (as in the accompanying
table). Reservations at the rate of 0.2 per cent of the portfolio per
AGENCY RATING
I. .
II .
IlL .
IV .
I-III. .
I-IV .
GAIN (+) ORLoss (-) OF
REALIZED COMPARED WITH
PROSPECTIVE YIELD
(PER CENT)
Unmodified Modified
+0.6 -0.1
+0.5 -0.3
+0.1 -0.6
+0.4 -0.9
+0.4 -0.4
+0.4 -0.5
annum would have been enough for the real losses from default and
credit impairment on a conservative portfolio of the two top agency
grades, but almost 1 per cent would have been necessary for a port-
folio concentrating in a representative cross-section of fourth-grade
corporates. While the modified loss rates indicate that higher reser-
vations out of interest receipts would have been necessary for the
riskier issues, the uniformity of modified realized yields compared
with the stepping-up of offering yields shows that buyers through
their bidding generally anticipated about the correct amount of
prospective-yield differential necessary to level the realized yields,
19. Difference between the above arithmetic means of weighted individual prospec-
tive and realized yields. Slight discrepancies are due to rounding to first decimal place.
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in the absence of money-market changes. Reference to the other parts
of Table 2 shows that the patterns become more erratic, as might
be expected, with fragmentation of the universe.
But such departures among the three parts of the universe-rail-
roads, public utilities, and industrials-from the average of all cor-
porates imply that discrimination in selection would have reduced
the rate of loss.
